Legal Proof Paying Taxes is VOLUNTARY — Challenging the IRS — Know Your Rights
July 16, 2013
God created men as executor & beneficiaries over the land, and no entity stands in between man and God. You must provide the following if he is even going to consider payment, let alone assume you have the authority over him.
1. Provide material evidence demonstrating that Brian Kelly created, incurred, agreed or consented to the alleged liability.
Administrator of Brian Kelly
1914: Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383. Established that illegally
obtained evidence may not be used by the court or admitted into
evidence. This case is very useful in refuting the use by the IRS of
income tax returns that were submitted involuntarily (note that these
returns must say “submitted under compulsion in violation of 5th
Amendment rights” or some such thing at the bottom.
that the 16th Amendment had no affect on the constitution, and that
income taxes could only be sustained as excise taxes and not as direct
taxes.”…the proposition and the contentions under [the 16th
Amendment]…would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy
another; That is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the
Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into
irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct
taxes be apportioned;This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the
limitations of the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must
have intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive
changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.Moreover in addition the Conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did
not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and
necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but on
the contrary recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its
nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it
was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the
result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation
was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to
disregard form and consider substance alone and hence subject the tax
to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise
would not apply to it.
….the Amendment demonstrates that no such purpose was intended and
on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining
the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation.”
….the [16th] Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging
the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word direct had a broader
significance since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal
property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at
least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the
Constitution — a condition which clearly demonstrates that the
purpose was not to change the existing interpretation except to the
extent necessary to accomplish the result intended, that is, the
prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxed income was
derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct
tax on the source itself and thereby to take an income tax out of the
class of excises, duties and imposts and place it in the class of
Indeed in the light of the history which we have given and of the
decision in the Pollock Case and the ground upon which the ruling in
that case was based, there is no escape from the Conclusion that the
Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future with
the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided, that is, of
determining whether a tax on income was direct not by a consideration
of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it directly
operated, but by taking into view the burden which resulted on the
property from which the income was derived, since in express terms the
Amendment provides that income taxes, from whatever source the income
may be derived, shall not be subject to the regulation of apportionment.
1922: Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20.
Prohibited Congress from legislating or controlling benefits that
employers provide to their employees. A major blow against socialism
in America! “Out of a proper respect for the acts of a co-ordinate
branch of the government, this court has gone far to sustain taxing
acts as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting, from
the weight of the tax, it was intended to destroy its subject. But in
the act before [259 U.S. 20, 38] us the presumption of validity
cannot prevail, because the proof of the contrary is found on the very
face of its provisions. Grant the validity of this law, and all that
Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its
control any one of the great number of subjects of public interest,
jurisdiction of which the states have never parted with, and which are
reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed
measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a
socalled tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word
‘tax’ would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the
powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the
1930: Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111.
The Supreme Court ruled that wages and compensation for personal
services were not to be taxed in their entirety, but instead, the gain
or profit derived indirectly from them.
1938: Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303.
Ruled that disputes over uncertainties in the tax code should be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer. “In view of other settled rules of
statutory construction, which teach that… if doubt exists as to the
construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the taxpayer…”
1959: Flora v. United, 362 US 145.
Ruled that our tax system is based on voluntary assessment and
payment, not on force or coercion. “Our system of taxation is based
upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint.”
1970: Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 at 748.
Supreme Court ruled that: “Waivers of Constitutional Rights not only
must be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences.”
1975: Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648.
Supreme Court ruled that income taxes constitute the compelled
testimony of a witness: “The information revealed in the preparation
and filing of an income tax return is, for the purposes of Fifth
Amendment analysis, the testimony of a witness.”
“Government compels the filing of a return much as it compels, for
example, the appearance of a `witness’ before a grand jury.”
1978: Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
Established that wages and income are NOT equivalent as far as taxes
on income are concerned.
“Decided cases have made the distinction between wages and income and
have refused to equate the two in withholding or similar
Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 318, 332, 373
F.2d 924, 932 (1967);
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 944, 950, 442
F.2d 1353, 1356 (1971);
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 920, 442
F.2d 1362 (1971);
Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (CA5
Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d, at 390; Acacia
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (Md. 1967).”
1985: U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605.
The production of evidence or subpoenaed tax documents cannot be
compelled. “We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under
the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the documents at issue in
this case is privileged and cannot be compelled without a statutory
grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 6002 and 6003.”
1991: Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192.
Held that if the defendant has a subjective good faith belief no
matter how unreasonable, that he or she was not required to file a tax
return, the government cannot establish that the defendant acted
willfully in not filing an income tax return. In other words, that
the defendant shirked a legal duty that he knew existed.
1992: United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 119 L Ed 2d 34, 112 S
Court held that income that is taxed under the 16th Amendment must
come from a “source”. Congress’s intent through 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code [26 USCS 61(a)]–which provides that gross income means
all income from whatever source derived, subject to only the
exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code…and
61(a)’s statutory precursors…”
1995: U.S. v. Lopez, 000 U.S. U10287.
Establishes strict limits on the constitutional power and jurisdiction
of the federal government inside the 50 States.
“We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers. See U.S. Const., Art. I, 8. As
James Madison wrote, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). This constitutionally mandated division of authority “was
adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Ibid.
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. The Court,
through Chief Justice Marshall, first defined the nature of Congress’
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824):
“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.”
The commerce power “is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution.” Id., at 196. The Gibbons Court,
however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are
inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.
“It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man
in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
“Comprehensive as the word `among’ is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . .
. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence,
must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.” Id., at
For nearly a century thereafter, the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions
dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress’ power, and almost
entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that
discriminated against interstate commerce. See, e.g., Veazie v.
Moor, 14 How. 568, 573-575 (1853) (upholding a state-created
steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation of wholly internal
commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17, 20-22 (1888) (upholding
a state prohibition on the manufacture of intoxicating liquor because
the commerce power “does not comprehend the purely domestic commerce
of a State which is carried on between man and man within a State or
between different parts of the same State”); see also L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 306 (2d ed. 1988). Under this line of
precedent, the Court held that certain categories of activity such as
“production,” “manufacturing,” and “mining” were within the province
of state governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121
(1942) (describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power. Perez v. United States, supra, at 150; see also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, at 276-277.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S., at 114 ; Heart of Atlanta
Motel, supra, at 256. “`[T]he authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses
has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.'”
[quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)].
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)
(upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles
used in intrastate commerce); Perez, supra, at 150 (“[F]or example,
the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. 32), or . . . thefts
from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. 659)”). Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 301 U.S., at 37 , i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT CASES:
U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977)
“Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral
duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be
intentionally misleading… We cannot condone this shocking
conduct…If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort
of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be
Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2nd 1378, 9th Cir., (1981)
“Persons dealing with government are charged with knowing government
statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that government
agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation”
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 9th
“All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge of the
Statutes-at-Large.. It is well established that anyone who deals with
the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the
government’s behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority”
Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236, at 238
“The revenue laws are a code or a system in regulation of tax
assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to
non-taxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedures are
prescribed for non-taxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of
their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress
does not assume to deal, and they are neither the subject nor the
object of the revenue laws.”
Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813, 135 Or. 180, 294 P.461, 73 A.L.R.
“The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere
privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which
owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the
individuals’ rights to live and own property are natural rights for
the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed.
283, 97 S.Ct. 310 (1976)”income” is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code”Congress has taxed INCOME, not compensation.” Conner v US 303 F
Supp. 1187 (1969) “There is a clear distinction between `profit’ and
wages’, or a compensation for labor. Compensation for labor (wages)
cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word
`profit’, as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or
investment- – – a different thing altogether from the mere
compensation for labor.”Oliver v Halsted, 86 SE Rep. 2nd 85e9 (1955).”. . .reasonable
compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit.”
Lauderdale Cemetery Assoc. V Mathews, 345 PA 239; 47 A 2d 277, 280
“…we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an
examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon
his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on
his private business in his own way. His power to contract is
unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far
as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state,
since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life
and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land
long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be
taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the
Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself,
and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure
except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so
long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It
is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It
receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter.
Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized
by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75] act as a corporation
are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation.
There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its
contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the
exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been
employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production
of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense
amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation which is charged
with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the
criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To
state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by
an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested
with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand
when charged with an abuse of such privileges. ”