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0:13 James Corbett: Welcome, friends. This is James Corbett of CorbettReport.com. It’s the 22nd of February, 2013 here in Japan, and once again we’re joined on the line for what’s becoming our regular weekly conversation with Sibel Edmonds on Operation Gladio Plan B. So once again, for those of you who are just joining this conversation now, I really suggest you go back and listen to the first three parts of this interview, which will be linked up in the show notes and which contain just incredible information about the real War on Terror paradigm and how it is really sponsored by the big boys at NATO and the US intelligence agencies, and other places. So, just incredible information that we’re getting week after week here. So Sibel, once again, thank you so much for your time tonight. I’m so much looking forward to our conversation today.
0:53 Sibel Edmonds: Oh, glad to be here. Honored to be here, James.
0:57 James: Excellent. Well, first let me just say, for all the people who are putting in their feedback and comments and questions through the contact form on CorbettReport.com: I very much appreciate all of that. I am saving it and logging it, and we’re going to get to all of those questions and comments next week. But this week we have a ton of information to go through on an extremely important topic, which is the drug trade — and especially heroin production and running — and how it’s protected from the very top.
1:28 And we started to broach this topic last week when we were talking about Hüseyin Baybaşin, who is known as Europe’s Pablo Escobar and who was thrown in prison — he was arrested in the late 1990s and convicted in 2001, I believe — and is currently serving time in the Netherlands, I believe, where he’s been jailed. But you were talking about having a meeting with some of his associates in London, and some of the information that they have and could provide about how his operations were protected by NATO itself.
2:01 And we started talking about that, so I hope people will go back and re-listen to that. But one of the things that — in my own re-listening to that part of our conversation — that kind of perplexed me a little bit was the role… because we started to talk about Israel and their role in playing the Kurds and their sympathies in the context of that conversation with Baybaşin’s men; but I wasn’t clear at all how Israel plays into the actual drug-running, or if that was a tangential topic, or if this is all NATO operations. So perhaps we could get into some more of the specifics of Baybaşin and how he actually operated.
2:37 Sibel: Sure. Yeah, we actually… that was a parallel topic, because we were going to get into this Hood Incident and why it took place. But I don’t have any information, direct information, that links either those Israelis placed in northern Iraq working with the Kurd… that have any relations with drugs or not: I don’t have any information on that.
3:02 And even with the information that we gathered within the FBI — this is through counterintelligence — we uncovered a lot of illegal criminal activities by Israeli actors, Pakistani actors, and… together with the Turkish actors here in the United States. And a lot of those illegal criminal activities that the Israelis were part of with the Turkish targets that we had, they were, one, nuclear black market-related; two, they were espionage-related — and this is, like, penetrating high offices within Congress, within the State Department, Pentagon, Air Force, et cetera; and these are Air Force weapons labs — but as far as narcotics are concerned, I don’t recall or I don’ t remember, and I don’t think that we had anything that linked — at least through our investigations with the FBI counterintelligence — Israelis.
4:10 So, let me make that clear. And it’s not because I’m a big fan of them. [laughs] It’s just that in this… they were engaged in a lot of illegal activities, criminal activities; but narcotics was not one of those, at least within the sphere of my involvement: direct, first-hand information in the FBI.
4:29 James: OK, well, then let’s talk a little bit more about Baybaşin’s activities in particular, and NATO’s role in that. And start to talk about how there is protection for some of these high agents and drug-runners: not only in Baybaşin’s case, but in others that we’re going to highlight in this conversation as well.
4:50 Sibel: Sure. Again, with Hüseyin Baybaşin — and this was in 2003, 2004 when his attorney in Holland, in the Netherlands contacted me — until that point, I was not familiar with Baybaşin, OK? Because his operation was mainly based in Europe: specifically United Kingdom, Brussels, Balkans, Turkey, Afghanistan. And I didn’t know his name. In fact, when I was contacted by his attorney, I was like, “Well, I don’t know who he is.” And that was when his attorney sent me links to some of his interviews.
5:30 I believe I received a copy of his book. No publisher was willing to publish it; in fact, you won’t find it in the market. His previous attorney published this book in the UK. He wrote it in Turkish; it was translated by one of his advocates in England. But it was self-published, and maybe a few hundred copies were sold; and you won’t find it in the market. But they sent me a copy of his book. They also gave me the links.
5:58 And when I read the sections in the interviews that he provided to both reporters in Guardian, in his book, and also Drug Links, I saw all these references of how he was working for the state — and that is Turkey — and how this drug operation — multi-billions, dollars, drug operations — were under him. But he was under the Turkish state, Turkish military. And the distribution of, transportation of this multi-billion dollar heroin was conducted through the Turkish diplomatic communities and Turkish military communities overseas. And by Turkish military communities overseas, he meant the Turkish NATO; the Turkish arm of NATO.
6:48 And it’s very easy: and as soon as I read these interviews, I knew that his case was connected to my case. His involved the UK aspects of it, Europe; mine involved the United States. And I knew because I knew the Hüseyin Baybaşins of the United States, OK? The Pablo Escobars of the United States dealing with heroin. It’s… there is the cocaine Godfathers, and there are heroin Godfathers. Especially those who were most active from mid-1990s ’til 9/11, a few months after 9/11. And we briefly mentioned and talked about Abdullah Çatlı when we started our interview series: well that was, again, one of his major roles that he played. And again, it was from his base in Chicago.
7:46 And another person I’m going to talk about… and the reason I’m able to talk about it is because this information became public at the time. Even now, the links to news sources: you see the references to articles, to even court documents for DEA documents, Drug Enforcement Agency’s; and some of these investigations of these drug cases that I’m going to talk about was — it was joint work between the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agencies — would be one of the guys who worked with, and for… — under — Abdullah Çatlı. And his name was Yaşar Öz.
8:30 Again, the links to the Turkish articles are not broken. [laughs] You can still see mainstream Turkish reports during these years on Yaşar Öz. Well, Yaşar Öz was a major operative for Gladio Plan A, from… original ones in Europe, but also for the US arm of it under Abdullah Çatlı. And in 1996, early 1997 — during that time frame — Yaşar Öz, during one of his many trips to the United States — because they managed multi-billion dollars’ worth heroin, OK? And this is heroin sourced from Afghanistan; this is before 9/11 — this is when a lot of mainstream publications refer to, “Oh, once Taliban took over Afghanistan, they stopped it, opium production.” Even though opium production was peaking, growing, expanding all the way from the end of 2000. And we’ll come back to this.
9:34 Anyhow, so, this guy: this heroin that was entering the US from Europe, a lot of it from Brussels — through this guy; and Abdullah Çatlı was for the US part — it was sourced to Afghanistan. These are Afghan-based opium, heroin produced from that opium. So during his last trip in the United States, Yaşar Öz was arrested — busted — by a joint FBI and DEA operation in New Jersey. He actually was meeting with a foreign correspondent, this Turkish reporter who was based in New York: corresponding and reporting back to Turkey, to one of their mainstream media sources.
10:23 Which, we will once day talk about it, and the various ways of intelligence collection. A lot of people talk about and know about, “Oh yeah, the CIAs who have State Department assignments: they are assigned to some embassies and consulates.” That’s the really old way. And the real spies are not placed in embassies; because everybody knows where to look at: embassies. And each country, especially the important countries, act differently in terms of where they like to place their intelligence officers, intelligence gatherers.
10:57 Anyhow, so he was meeting with this reporter — who was also involved in the network — and the bust took place. And he had with him several kilograms of pure heroin. They arrested him. In fact, it even leaked to the media, US media, that this Turkish guy — because this was a high amount, kilogram, of heroin — and the Turkish guy was arrested. Then they took him to DEA’s New Jersey office for interrogation.
11:29 And this interesting — very, very interesting — thing happens; and this gets to be reported a couple of days later: while he was being interrogated by DEA agents in one of DEA’s offices — field offices in New Jersey — he found a way to escape. He then went to JFK that same day, and he boarded the first-class Turkish airline at 10:30 PM that evening and went to Turkey.
12:06 So, something took place between the time he was arrested in New Jersey and a few hours later. The public, they don’t know. Actually, nobody knows in the US; because there was a little blurb news in the media here, but then there was no follow-up reports from the media here in the US: like, “Well, how did he escape?” He was arrested; he was in this field office for interrogation; and then he just sneaked out: didn’t go in hiding somewhere, he went to JFK; and from there he boarded — first-class — Turkish airlines and went to Turkey.
12:41 Well, what happened is we in the FBI knew, because there are files on this; because it’s, again, related to the same Gladio B operation. As soon as he was arrested, within just a few minutes, the news went to the State Department, OK? Again, you have to ask: who is informing the State Department? Yeah, he’s a foreign national; but actually, he was one of the wanted as well within EUROPOL/INTERPOL during this time. But State Department steps in, and within a couple of hours DEA’s told, “Release this guy.” FBI’s told, “Release this guy.”
13:24 Why? Because he has diplomatic immunity. Now: he doesn’t have any title that says he is in any way connected — official title — to Turkish embassies or consulates or Turkish military attaché. However, he carries this passport… because he had four passports. He also had special NATO ID, NATO ID, with him.
13:47 So, Yaşar Öz was released quietly. And when the media, both from Turkey and here, they saw some comments, DEA said, “Uh, he escaped. We don’t know: he just evaporated.” [laughs] During this…
14:03 James: Funny how that works. But… so, just to be clear, how was Yaşar related to Abdullah Çatlı? Were they partners?
14:09 Sibel: These are the operatives. They are no different than, let’s say, CIA operatives. These are the black ops operatives for the NATO Gladio A. Because these are the guys who basically handled… both on the ground, but within their own mafia network — which was Abdullah Çatlı. Who was he, and why he was recruited? Well, first he was in jail. Then he was released so that he would be trained and join NATO and Turkey’s Gladio operation in 1980s. Same thing with some of these other guys.
14:44 Well, the same thing with Yaşar Öz: he was, again, one of the Godfathers, but his ranking would be below Abdullah Çatlı. Because if you follow his Wikipedia entries or some of the Turkish press media stuff, you will see that… his involvement with all these casinos in Cyprus: these are the Turkish; this is the Turkish portion of Cyprus, the island. You will see his involvement with the First Merchant Bank — that we will get into. So he was one of the mafia, also Gladio operatives; but his ranking was… his boss would be Abdullah Çatlı.
15:25 Abdullah Çatlı’s boss would be Mehmet Eymür. And this was the high-ranking counterterrorism officer that was, after Susurluk, sent to Turkish embassy in Washington, DC to be protected from the Turkish investigations of Susurluk there; and he stayed. He was given citizenship six months later: not Green Card, citizenship. And this is… it would be equivalent to the counterterrorism czar if we have such a… [laughs] such a thing today in the United States.
15:56 That was his position. He was the top guy in Turkish government, Turkish intelligence, military intelligence-gathering position for Gladio NATO operations. So that would be Abdullah Çatlı’s boss; and his boss would be people within the NATO — which would be US arms and, especially, UK arms, and some of the CIA actors in there. So if you were to look at the hierarchy, that’s how the hierarchy worked.
16:28 James: And Yaşar Öz, when he was detained, was found to be carrying, actually, Turkish diplomatic materials — passports or documents of some sort — that were signed off on by a Turkish official. Was that the same one that ended up fleeing to Washington?
16:43 Sibel: Uh, I believe that was Mehmet Ağar. I know the names, the foreign names are so difficult to follow. And I’m so careful, I’m trying so hard not to throw in too many foreign names. But Mehmet Ağar was also a major. He was on the police side: because we have two types of police in Turkey. One is the Jandarma [laughs], and then we have the regular lower-level police. And everybody knows that the Jandarma one — which is under military intelligence agency — they are the ones who are the first level in harassing people and jailing them; torturing them. Or getting them disappeared, which — you see that a lot in Turkey. Especially during those years, you saw a lot of disappearing people; journalists would disappear: they would just evaporate.
17:30 So, Jandarmas would be carrying out those operations. And that would be Mehmet Ağar within the same group — this is NATO’s Operation Plan A; this was in 1995, 1996. That was switched later. But the importance of this is: again, the media, the narrative — the official narrative in the US on the opium production from all the poppies in Afghanistan — is that the production stopped because Taliban illegalized it — you know, they were extremist Islamists — and then, after 9/11, it started picking up again. And it’s not true: that is not true. The opium production was doing quite well in Afghanistan. In fact, if you look at the graph, you would see that it was increasing towards 2000.
18:23 And then there was this sudden stop in 2000 — mid- to late-2000 — which is extremely important in terms of 9/11 — and we’ll get to that later. Because we know that the United States had very cozy relationship with the Taliban: back then, we referred to them as the freedom fighters, the mujahideen, in 1980s. If you’re gonna look at all these documentaries produced by PBS, you see how they were all glorified. It didn’t matter then, there, that they covered up their wives; they were, you know, raping little girls or boys. It didn’t matter to us that they were extremists, they went to madrasa. It didn’t matter to us that they were fanatics. We never talked about those: they were freedom fighters against Communists: the bad Communists. They were glorified!
19:13 We loved mujahideen. We loved these same Talibans that now we portray differently. You know: “These monstrous-looking, primitive guys,” et cetera. And so what happened was that in 1990s, it went back and forth — our relationship with the Talibans. And then comes this period when we try to actually re-establish our relationship and even recognize Taliban. Remember? This is when Cheney and the group, they brought these Taliban leaders officially to the United States. They even went to Texas.
19:51 Well, Afghanistan was extremely important to us. I refer to Pipelineistan — this is Pepe Escobar, the way Pepe Escobar puts it — because for all the plans that we have for the pipelines for Central Asia, Caucasus, Eurasia, and how things would travel, we needed Afghanistan. And we were coming to the point that we were saying, “Well, if we have to make a deal and be friends with the Taliban, so be it: we will be. We don’t care that they’re extremists or fanatics.”
20:21 And during this time, if you go and look at those articles, they’re — you know, maybe the links are broken; [laughs] because a lot of links are broken to important articles nowadays — you will see that we were considering to become really good friends with the Talibans. However — back to the heroin production, opium production — what happened is after the Soviet was defeated and they backed out from Afghanistan, the relationship between the Russians and Afghanistan actually didn’t end. Because the military was removed, but you had both the Russian government-related, close-to-the-Russian-government people; the Russian mafiya, that continued their presence in the region. Why? The opium. Heroin.
21:11 And so during this time we had basically two groups of players — “this time” being 1990s — in Afghanistan in relation to heroin, OK? A big percentage, actually, was being operated, transported, in the labs processed, by the Russian mafiya, OK? And then there was a portion that was completely under the control of the Turks — and, “Turks:” under Gladio, under NATO Turks, OK? And don’t quote me on the percentage, but if I were to throw a percentage, I would say the percentage would be 70 percent Russians, 30 percent Turks, OK?
21:56 And with Russia, again, it… how the route was, the transport of the opium, where the labs were, was completely a different category than how the Turks operated. Now with the Turks, who did we have? We had — in the United Kingdom — Baybaşin, OK? And they had their network of couriers also, from Afghanistan, to get things through the porous borders. And in some cases, a lot of these couriers were the Kurds that were being used.
22:25 But then, once this stuff got into Turkey — and in early 1990s a lot of labs were placed in Turkey. You know, you need tons of chemicals to turn these poppies into heroin, OK? And it requires… in Afghanistan there are primitive ways of going about it. You won’t be able to produce tons and tons of heroin that way; you can produce a small quantity. But then there’s a sophisticated method, and Turkish labs had these sophisticated methods.
23:02 In mid-1990s — around 1996, 1997 — a lot of these labs actually moved to Central Asia, some of the countries in the Caucasus. Because by then, the United States, Turks: they had already converted some of these countries. And we referred to Azerbaijan, for example: how Aliyev was more siding with Russians. With all the assassination attempts, the blackmail through the casinos, we had pulled a lot of levers to move to Azerbaijan, because logistically it was more important.
23:35 Once it gets to that point — Azerbaijan, Turkey — then the transports — we are not talking about the mules, you know? In looking at Afghanistan, you have to have the couriers in some primitive ways — this is before 9/11, OK? — to carry these loads. Because… not through the airplanes there. But then after that, once it gets to Turkey, at this level you have the heroin. And again, in the reports you see these trucks that are going to Bulgaria from Turkey, because Bulgaria is a neighbor; Romania; and from there getting into Netherlands, then Italy; and some of it coming to the United States. But what you don’t see is the amount — which is a significant amount — that comes via official channels.
24:24 And you say that today, and they would call you a conspiracy theorist. They would call you crazy. If I were to tell you that huge amount of this heroin was coming to the United States through Andrews Air Force Base, people would say, “That is the craziest thing I’ve ever heard!” OK? Because people want to believe that that would be crazy. I mean, there are people — even with all the documents being public, being known — they consider Iran-Contra something that really didn’t happen and it was a conspiracy theory: believe me or not. Because it’s more convenient to think that way. Because it really… once people understand and believe and see these realities, it will be something to digest. Because that’s gonna change their viewing of the world and their nation and nationalism.
25:18 You know, it’s… you hear about — and I have a degree in criminal psychology, and my field of study was serial killers — and all those cases, looking at the mothers: even with all the evidence presented, they will say, “My son would never do something…” [laughs] You know? And in this case, with… seeing our government being involved with things like Iran-Contra, you know; with what Gary Webb exposed: I mean, you’re looking at crack epidemics. Then you throw in… and even if you were to come and show the documents where FBI is tipped off, or DEA, about certain military people coming through Andrews Air Force Base with… they’re coming from either Netherlands or from Brussels, and they land in Andrews Air Force Base — and knowing that this plane is also loaded with heroin — but they can’t do anything about it — I mean, who are they gonna go after, at the FBI?
26:15 First of all, they have to be given the OK by the FBI’s boss. And this plane is loaded only by Americans and the diplomatic community — the military, NATO community. So even if you were to put all these documents and if you make it public, people would look at you with the blank eyes, and they would say, “That’s not possible.” Or, “Maybe our government has a very good explanation for this. There must be an explanation for this…”
26:41 James: Oh, they always have one, don’t they?
26:43 Sibel: [laughs] That’s right.
26:43 James: Well, perhaps we should back up for a little; because I think it’s important to note that the very heroin trade from — the opium trade turning into the heroin trade — from Afghanistan also originated in NATO operations, or at least in US operations. Specifically, when we look back at the origins of the Afghan uprising against the Soviets in 1979, really, with Operation Cyclone — as Zbigniew Brzezinski has come out and admitted now, that the US was involved even before the Soviets ever came in.
27:13 Sibel: Yes.
27:13 James: And right from the beginning, they were supporting people like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — indirectly, through Pakistan, but still supporting people like that — which was the basis for this. And of course, this all comes out through the reporting of Alfred McCoy — but perhaps you can talk a little bit about that.
27:29 Sibel: Absolutely. And I believe he’s… I consider him to be the top researcher. And if you were to go and study and read his academic work, all based on research — he’s not a conspiracy theorist, he’s a professor; he’s a very well-respected professor — he’s talking about all the parallels; you know: Golden Triangle; Golden Crescent. And he also shows how the amount decreases once we leave Vietnam. What was being produced once upon a time in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and then — [gestures: WHOOSH!] — the amount increases in Afghanistan. And he provides incredible statistics and graphs showing the correlation between our military — NATO or our military; CIA — being active in places; the drug production, you know, quadrupling; going, really, up-up-up-up-up — exploding, basically — and then we leave and go somewhere else; and that’s where we’ll see the same thing starting.
28:33 So you’re absolutely right: because, as always — whether through military operations, black ops — we relied on… we have been relying on narcotics to fund a lot of our operations. It… forget about the illegal aspects of heroin. When you look at the world resources and the competition over the world resources, I mean, you think of — OK, there’s oil, there’s gas, there are the minerals, [unintelligible 29:02] like, OK, the uranium’s here, and gold, and — you know, we’re looking at diamonds, and… well, you look at the value, market value of heroin. And again, some people, they say currently it’s $35 billion dollars; where some people are saying, “No, no, no: it’s close to $100 billion dollars at street value.”
29:24 We don’t have the value, a concrete one, established; but when we are looking at something like $50 billion dollars a year, that becomes a very important world resources that people complete over, OK? And this is why I was going to get to the point with the Russians: because after the Russians left, well, the Russian mafiyas also wanted the big chunk of it — and actually, they got it. And they established their relationship with Taliban; and it was pure business relationship. So, they controlled a lot of market.
30:00 Now, when you fast-forward and you come to 9/11 — post-9/11 — you see that slowly that percentage — actually, not very slowly; pretty rapidly — went down — Russian percentage, value; the share — and US share went up: to a point that today, basically, except for some side kick, Russians don’t have any of these resources. So for me, it’s very interesting: Russia has been — lately, they’ve been very outspoken and loud, saying they have several million heroin addicts in Russia because of the increase in production in Afghanistan, and this is due to NATO and the US.
30:43 And some of the MPs in Russia — and including generals, top generals — have gone even further. If you go and look at some of these publications, they say that they believe NATO, the CIA, they play the major role — top role — in both production and transportation of this heroin. They’re saying, “It’s been dealt in our country; we have millions of heroin addicts.” And a few months ago — you remember, you and I have been communicating on this — Russia said, “We want to participate in this eradication program with…” — what a joke: that’s what we are doing, Americans there — so US said, “OK, fine, we’ll let you be part of this.” And then that deal fell through: it didn’t go through. Then they went back to screaming again about this.
31:33 Well, part of it is true; because the percentage of heroin users in Russia has exploded: it’s huge — which really brings to mind the Opium Wars with China, you know? That was the method that… that was a very well-planned, strategically-planned war. And when you look at all the heroin consumption going up in Russia, it’s like… the parallel is interesting. But I’m not gonna go there. But the other part of Russians being pissed off is that they lost the share: because they had the big chunk of this revenue before; they don’t now. It is completely, completely handled and controlled from the source, Afghanistan — who has a base there? — all the way to the transport through the Balkans.
32:22 When you look at — I mean, if you go and look at, say, Romania, and then you look at Brussels: you look at all these places — and then, of course, some of it comes to the United States. Some people, they say it’s only 10 percent comes to the US: whatever. So, you see that shift. And again, the amount is not just like some peanuts: we are looking at at least $50 billion dollars a year worth of resources that… how they are being used, what they are doing with it: your guess is as good as mine on that.
32:56 Then again, the other thing that is important — and again, this is post-9/11, and I sent you a couple of links — once would be, you come across some incidents that are completely buried within the United States media: no reporting. A few years ago, the Dutch police arrested, because they were wiretapping, this high-level NATO general — OK? High-level NATO general — who was in charge of the NATO base in Romania. And this is Willem Matser; and this case related to this cocaine that was gonna come through couriers and to Italy. And he was basically involved in this cocaine deal and money laundering deal. And this was worth, whatever: $20 million dollars, $15 million dollars. Well, he got arrested.
33:49 Again, he’s not the homie guy out there selling three grams of marijuana. You’re looking at several large kilograms of cocaine, and you’re looking at a NATO general — active, Romania, UK-based. So, he gets arrested. He gets busted by the Dutch police; and then some Kafkaesque court process takes place; and then he’s released a few months later: six or seven months later. And then, nobody then reports on him, of what happened. So you get to have — like Baybaşin — you get to have Willem Matser with these NATO actors.
34:29 Now, what happened here? Why did Dutch police… started chasing this guy? Why did they chase this guy? We don’t know, because there is really no… not much reportage. Some in the UK; some in Germany; and a couple of reporters in Holland: they wrote about this. But then everybody says, “Well, the court through the process was pretty Kafkaesque with all the high-level NATO people coming, being present; and then, six months later, the judge let him go.” Well, this is very, very important when you start talking about NATO generals being involved in narcotics and money laundering. And, not being reported: not even one publication here…
35:17 James: Exactly right. And just to be clear for people out there, he was actually arrested on charges of laundering at least $200 million dollars for an international drug cartel that involved people like Mohammed Kadem and also Pietro Fedino, who’s a wealthy Sicilian with a previous conviction for cocaine smuggling. So this is not a small charge by any means. And Willem Matser, again: part of the NATO staff there. Just an incredible connection.
35:43 But exactly on that point, it raises the question: for example, I can understand how some officials who don’t know about the Gladio B operation might accidentally arrest one of these people who are involved with this — which may have been the case with someone like Matser, for example, because after his show trial he was released with time served. And Yaşar Öz manages to escape and is never brought in for questioning ever again.
36:14 Sibel: Exactly.
36:15 James: And yet you have people like Baybaşin, who gets thrown in jail and is still there to this day — and is likely to rot in jail. So I’m wondering what the discrepancy is, there. Is it just a question of, some people want to play ball, and other people are gonna blow the whistle?
36:29 Sibel: Uh, that’s a very good point. And you’re right: some people are always stay within the system. Some people, they get inflicted by this thing called hubris and say, “You know what? I’m getting pretty powerful. Maybe a lot of this, you know, big-share part of it goes to the Turkish government and NATO. I want to maybe have a bigger… I’m a…” They start viewing themselves bigger than what, actually, they are. And that happens sometimes. And sometimes it happens with the head of the states: it can happen with somebody like Gaddafi; it can happen with Saddam, you know?
37:04 Because they… after a while, it gets to you. It’s like, “I’m powerful. You know what? I’m going to stand up to these guys too.” And the other core part of it has to do with the ethnic origin of Baybaşin — and that being, he’s Kurdish — and the conflict with the Kurds: because, as we talked about before, Kurds are always being used. They are being used, or they were being used, by the Israelis. They were used by the US during the no-fly zone — and this is in 1990s with Saddam. They actually are used with the state that’s been fighting against them — and that is Turks — for a drug operation.
37:45 Because, it’s really interesting: on one hand, that faction of Kurds — not all Kurds — serve the Turkish interests. But then those same Kurds would want to have the money associated for providing these services. And then, they take that money: then, they go and get their own Kalashnikovs from the Russians to arm themselves against the Turks. It is so convoluted. And so, these relationships and alliances are there.
38:12 So I believe Baybaşin… and again, this is a hypothesis; I don’t know the real facts, what happened; I don’t even know why they backed off. Because some deal was cut through. One of the things that Baybaşin was afraid — and I’m going back to my meeting in London — at that time, was the Turkish government wanted to see him extradited to Turkey, saying, “He’s a Turkish citizen. Holland, you shouldn’t keep him in jail. We want him here.” And boy, he didn’t want to go to Turkey! OK? [laughs] You know, just… lots of quick, mysterious deaths happen there. So this was during this crucial times that, not only he was fighting the charges against him and he was appealing, but also he was fighting this attempt by Turkey to extradite him back to Turkey.
39:03 So this was a time he was saying, “Well, maybe if I’d scratch her back, she’ll scratch my back. We’ll do some stuff.” But then some deal took place; and I don’t know the details, because nobody in the media is reporting. So he stayed in the same jail in Holland, OK? And he actually was taken from high security to the more average prison cell where he can pursue his art interests, et cetera, et cetera. And then the communications ceased after that.
39:32 So maybe during that period, maybe that was why they wanted to contact me: because they were like, “Maybe this is the card we play — that our case intersects with Sibel Edmonds’ case — if this extradition goes through. To prove that Turkey is in this position, that if I were to be extradited there this will happen to me: maybe that would be the time for me to show some of those insurance documents, those insurance that I had on my side.” But whatever it was, I guess it was settled; and the extradition didn’t take place. So, the scratching didn’t take place: we didn’t scratch each other’s backs.
40:16 James: Very interesting. And of course all of this brings up — especially in the Willem Matser case, where he was specifically brought up on charges of laundering $200 million dollars — of course, this multinational, multi-billion dollar a year heroin trade can’t take place without incredible amounts of money laundering. And that, of course, brings in the whole banking sector into this mix. And I understand you have some information about First Merchant Bank.
40:40 Sibel: Correct. And one of the comments, I guess, we’ve been getting is how much I move when I talk. [laughs] And I want to explain this one thing about moving a lot: because while I’m answering these questions, my mind is going through several different places. So I have, very quickly, to think about what I can point to, say, “Hey, this information was public before I spoke and therefore I can expand upon it,” versus some information that’s never been public and that I got through my work there [i.e., at the FBI].
41:14 Now, with First Merchant Bank, this… actually, First Merchant Bank case came up during Susurluk scandal. See, that’s… like, we keep going back and forth to where we started from, and the scandal where NATO afterwards started going to Plan B. And that was the main bank that was used by NATO, by CIA, by these mafia people. And if you look at some of the people there with high stakes, you will see some heads of state in Turkey, as high as former Prime Ministers — huge. It’s in Cyprus.
41:49 Cyprus was, I would say, the top center for money laundering and financial transactions that dealt with both the heroin aspects of Gladio operations — NATO, Turkey, the CIA — but also weapons smuggling: money obtained from that. Cyprus — not only the banks, but Cyprus location — was used for a lot of these false end-user certificate operations, where weapons are ordered from Turkey and the destination — arrival destination — is Cyprus; however, from Cyprus it goes through to other countries.
42:32 And then you see this: the three major centers… and this is based on the FBI’s investigations, 1996 to 2001, where all the activities of the terrorists — and these are what we refer to today as al-Qaeda, OK? Our friends; mujahideen; Zawahiri; — that that money from that heroin, they were all part of the same operations. Illegal weapons smuggling — with three centers. Number one, serving the first step for our bad guys — meaning the US, et cetera, CIA — was Cyprus. From Cyprus; then — after Cyprus — the two other branch important areas were Dubai — always Dubai! — and Cayman Islands.
43:21 Cayman Islands: you’re gonna say, “Turkey, Gladio operations?!” But Cayman Islands was extremely important in these operations. Because some of this money also had to come back to the United States; and a lot of this money didn’t come directly from First Merchant Bank — all the terrorist activities — directly to the United States. The intermediary station was the Cayman Islands. And then, from the Cayman Islands, that money would come to finance some operations — some illegal operations — in the United States. And you’re gonna say, “Hmm, that’s very interesting.”
44:03 One of the things I would like you to do, James, would be to show… this is six years ago: I put the pictures of a bunch of US officials; and I said, “You want to know why there’s a state secrets privilege on me? As far as the US persons involved: ‘These are the known US persons involved?’ There are some pictures there.” Well, then you’re gonna come to a picture of a former Congressman: and this is Bob Livingston. Bob Livingston was the Speaker of the House until 1999. He had some scandals; he resigned; and he was replaced by Dan Hastert — Dennis Hastert. Well, Dennis Hastert: there’s an article in Vanity Fair, and his picture is in there.
44:49 Well, Dan Burton, when he… while he was in Congress, he played a major role — same as Dennis Hastert — for these Gladio operations and CIA black ops involving Bin Laden, Zawahiri. And then you’re gonna say, “Well, what is Congress’ role in all this?” Congress has a huge role; because to fund these black ops, we are talking about heroin, weapons smuggling being one way, OK? And this is before 9/11, I believe. After 9/11, it became easier.
45:23 Another way we were funding our plans — Bin Laden, and Zawahiri, and the Chechens, and the stuff we were doing there in Central Asia/Caucasus — were through funds assigned by the United States Congress to NGOs, non-governmental organizations, with noble missions in Central Asia and Caucasus. There are dozens of foundations like this that are set up in the United States to promote democracy in Kyrgyzstan; to improve the prison conditions in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. I mean, look at our prison conditions here in the United States! But American NGOs are so idealistic, man! I mean, they are setting up, they are going all over the world. They travel over there to take care of the prisons there while we are so screwed up here. Now, that should be beyond anyone saying…
46:25 But look at their budgets: you’re looking at tens of millions of dollars a year. We don’t have any NGOs taking care of the single one of our scandalous prisons in the United States, [laughs] or with the cases of Guantánamo Bay, but we have dozens of NGOs who want to improve the prison conditions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. They want to improve the education; they want to fight for the rights of the journalists in these countries. And again, if you look at the budget: tens of millions of dollars. And a lot of these NGOs — and some of them are, NGOs: a lot of them — they are also businesses, OK?
47:07 So in 1990s, our CIA and the State Department, they said, “A portion of it, this is how we’re gonna fund it, OK? We’re gonna put together these grants; we’re gonna say, ‘This is a developmental grant for Azerbaijan to improve their infrastructure and roads; and we’re gonna build bridges and tunnels and metro trains,’ et cetera, et cetera, OK? This is improvement. We’re gonna make them…” you know. And then they’re… NGOs, they are looking for [laughs] looking after the prisons and human rights. [laughs] We took care of all our human rights here; they have to take care of their human rights there. Again: tens of millions of dollars.
47:50 So what happens is these grant requests — OK? — goes to Congress. Congress has to approve it. So, Congress has to approve it: which is, you have the Committee on Commerce; then you have Foreign Relations Committee in the US Congress, both House and the Senate. Of course, the Speaker of the House plays a big role, because they’re one of the most powerful people to pull the strings.
48:15 So what do you want, as the CIA and the State Department? You want to have the top guys within some of these committees — both in the Senate and in the House — on your side, to rubber-stamp these requests. And when some scandal breaks — and, let’s say, even if some foreign country comes, their lobby; and to US Congress, goes to that committee, says, “Yo, dude! You gave grants to this Turkish construction company to do this here: five years there, they haven’t built a single road. In fact, they have five madrasas, and here are documentation — evidence — that they are training — militarily training — Islamic factions that are doing this. So, do something!”
49:05 Do you think that something like this doesn’t happen? I’m not giving you hypothetical example here; I’m giving you real examples that were taking place in late 1990s, OK? When you have one group, even from Turkey, coming to US — going to Congress — and showing Congressional committee evidence saying, “Well, these NGOs or these companies that are receiving your grants are actually doing this.”
49:35 If, as CIA and the State Department, you don’t have the chairman of that committee — OK? — and the Speaker of the House, and those guys under your thumb, you’re gonna be in trouble: because then it’s gonna leak. There’s gonna be Congressional hearings, investigations; the grant is gonna be suspended; it’s gonna leak to the media. So this is the reason why they have to corrupt — or start with the corrupt members of — Congress, and suck them into all these illegal operations that included Operation Gladio and the CIA black ops in Central Asia and Caucasus.
50:10 So I’m just like… OK, Dennis Hastert, his name came up: he was one of those. I’m gonna go back to where I started. Bob Livingston: Speaker of the House; resigns in 1999. He starts making tens of millions of dollars, suddenly, because he registers under FARA: Foreign Agents Registration Act — the law, which has 157 loopholes to go around — and becomes the official foreign lobbyist for the government of Turkey and for Cayman Islands, OK?
50:45 This is very important, extremely important .Because usually, some Congressmen: during their tenure, if they have done — while they are serving as the US Representative — some foreign interests; if they do a good job of serving that foreign interest while they are in Congress; they get rewarded officially once they resign or retire. That foreign country says, “I love you,” you know? “I want you to be my lobbyist.”
51:12 You look at somebody like Dan Burton, for example: he was known to scratch Pakistan’s back, for example, or India’s back — while the US Representative, OK? And once he decided he was not going to run again, et cetera, then he becomes — as soon as he’s out — he’s gonna become the lobbyist for either India or Pakistan. But usually they have a specific region that their specialty or their previous service implies.
51:41 Now, with Bob Livingston, it’s very important: Cayman Islands and Turkey. You would think, “Cayman Islands, Turkey? They’re like two totally different…” And there’s a very important reason for this. Same thing with Dennis Hastert: Dennis Hastert retired in 2007 after that article came out, in Vanity Fair, article exposing him as related to my case — not that the people cared here. But as soon as he resigned — three months after he resigned — he registered under FARA: Foreign Agents Registration Act. And now he’s receiving $3.5 million dollars a year — this is just the official amount — from the Turkish government. He is the representative, the lobbyist.
52:23 But they don’t become lobbyists by just retiring: you have to serve those interests while you’re in there. Well, in this case, not only they were serving the Turkish and Cayman Islands’ interests — not their governments’, really: they were serving the CIA and the State Department’s illegal operations in Central Asia/Caucasus by [unintelligible 52:46] of those nations — because they were fully aware in the mid-1990s that almost every single penny of close to a billion dollars — hundreds of millions of dollars, OK? — allocated by the United States Congress for Central Asia/Caucasus NGOs — human rights-related NGOs, education-related NGOs for that region, et cetera — and businesses…
53:16 And if, James, you go and look at these businesses that got these grants to implement projects like road infrastructure, to develop tourism in Turkmenistan, it would be this US business getting the — and these are front companies, OK? — these will be this US business getting the grant of $55, $60 million dollars a year from United States Congress to develop tourism in Turkmenistan, OK? Or construction, infrastructure. Now: this front US company then would take this grant and give it to their subcontractors. In the paper, the subcontractors are shown as various Turkish companies, and these are the members of the American-Turkish Council here in the United States, related to my case. They are construction companies; they are the pipeline companies.
54:16 So then, — supposedly — these companies then go to Turkmenistan and set up great tourism for them; or build bridges, and turn the caves into tunnels; et cetera. A lot of those things: they don’t take place. If anybody, any journalist, would want to go and follow up on, by today, billions of dollars spent, we’ve spent in Central Asia and Caucasus — taxpayer dollars granted by US Congress — and if you go and see what was produced on the other end, you’re gonna see that they don’t have anything to show.
54:45 These are front companies. This is part of the funding for the mosques — whether it’s 1,300 in Kazakhstan, the number — or madrasas, and the mosques; and the weapons smuggling; and the training of the mujahideens. And training and dividing these various Islamic factions: whether it’s the Salafis against Wahhabis, or those Wahhabis against the Sufis. That is where this money is being used, OK?
55:18 And that’s one way. One way is heroin; one way is that. So again, back to the stuff: Cayman Island banks? Bob Livingston has been the lobbyist representing the interests of Cayman Island banks; and Bob Livingston also has been the lobbyist representing the government of Turkey. And they are very closely linked.
55:40 And as far as the banks are concerned, the First Merchant Bank was one that FBI was regularly — long before 9/11 — reporting to two places, OK? “Based on our findings, Mr. State Department, Mr. Commerce Department, — US Commerce Department — this bank is involved with our criminal targets — Turkish criminal targets — which were working with criminal US people who are not our targets — FBI targets; — and they’re involved in heroin and money laundering; and the bank is being used for this; and we have all this evidence.” The State Department would do nothing.
56:21 So First Merchant Bank kept operating, OK? 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001: 9/11 takes place. The FBI agents are livid! They’re like, “You’re gonna shut…” This is… they go — this is the US government — they shut down all these different banks related to Palestinian causes saying they are terrorists, while there was no indication that those banks had anything to do with the so-called al-Qaeda. Yet, the number one bank associated with Bin Laden, Zawahiri, al-Qadi — all those actors, and also involved with Dubai — is First Merchant Bank.
57:03 9/11 happens: agents are livid. They go back again to the State Department and the Department of Commerce. They say not only that, “You’ve gotta shut them down, put sanctions on them;” but, “We need to arrest some of these people. We know who are the terrorist financiers.” OK? This is what FBI was telling the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce, they said they were not going to do anything. It didn’t happen until 2004. First Merchant Bank was not declared as the number one financier of terror, heroin, money laundering, all of them related to terror around the world — this is our terror — until 2004.
57:43 Now, you have to ask why. [slaps table, long pause] I have a couple of explanations, possible explanations. One of them was that it was going to take at least that long for some of our continuous operations’ funding to come to the end, for them to switch with other banks. And I’m sure there are several banks that have replaced First Merchant Bank now. And I have a pretty good idea, because I’m not… a lot of this First Merchant Bank-related stuff from the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Division was also forwarded to FBI White Collar Crime, OK? They deal with the money laundering and all the different ways of… there are so many different ways to launder money.
58:42 I’m not expert, and I don’t have expertise in this topic, so I don’ t know the details of how it took place. One thing that got my attention with First Merchant Bank, in… one way they were laundering money was, a lot of cash — we are looking at tens, in some cases hundreds of millions of dollars — were being converted to government bonds; but these governments were Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan. And that was very interesting for me. Now, for someone who understands money laundering and is not as ignorant as me… I know it was money laundering because I was told that it was. But I know that this particular approach they did through First Merchant Bank, you would see the accounts of all the Presidents in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; and then you would see the money was being invested and they were buying these bonds; and then later that money was being converted back — those bonds — to money again.
59:40 I don’t exactly know what the process is; all I know is that some of those bonds dealt also with maturity, or the expiration date, or whatever it was; that they needed to keep those. They couldn’t move those from those accounts, for some reason, to others, considering that the top Presidents — these are the dictators of these countries, Kazakhstan, Turk… — they all had the accounts in First Merchant Bank. And the US CIA money laundering scheme also included converting this black money into Kazakhi bonds — like, $25 million dollars in Mongoli or Kazakhstan gold bonds — and then how that money, then, was taken out.
60:24 So, that may be a possible explanation. I don’t know, because that totally falls within the financial, money laundering experts… their expertise. And I don’t know enough in this area to even begin to explain the possible or most likely reasons why it lasted ’til 2004.
60:47 James: Well, I hope people appreciate just how many leads and tips we are giving to investigative journalists…
60:52 Sibel: [laughs]
60:52 James: …and money laundering experts, and everyone out there who can actually pursue all of these leads. But before we leave it — we’re already up on the one hour mark, so we should be winding things up — but before we leave it there, you mentioned that Cyprus and the Cypriot banks were extremely important to this entire money laundering operation. And I find that interesting because — at least these days — Cypriot banks are famous for being connected to the Russian mafiya and the Russian oligarchs. And it is to the point where Cyprus is actually Russia’s largest foreign investor — which is just a mind-blowing fact until you know that Cypriot banks are supposedly famous for being safe havens for Russian oligarch money. So, how does that play into that? Is that something that’s only developed since the exposure of First Merchant Bank, and things have moved elsewhere?
61:43 Sibel: That’s very interesting, because I haven’t really done much research on that. But I wonder… because, again, with the Cypriot banks, it depends on which ones: the Greek side or the Turkish side. So, the Russians are… which side are they, these banks?
61:57 James: Actually, I think it’s Greek, so… [unintelligible 61:59]
62:00 Sibel: OK: so if they are Greek, it makes sense, OK? Number one, because of the proximity for them to be in exactly the other side of the border — which is very close. Because as we talked about, Russians know what NATO’s Gladio Operation Plan A, Plan B are, OK? They know the details, they have some of the people who have defected to Russia. And it’s very interesting, because I didn’t know about this until you mentioned that they are using the same island: because you have incredible amount of intelligence penetration between the two. You know: the life-long enemies, the Greeks and the Turks; and Cyprus has been always the conflict region. You know, Greeks says, “It’s ours,” and Turks says, “No, it can’t even be part of EU because half of it is ours.”
62:54 So because of that, there’s a lot of intelligence gathering being conducted from both sides. There are informants; there are penetrations. So, they spy on each other all the time; so it would be extremely important and beneficial for Russians — very smart — to go to the other side. Because they are taking advantage of both the espionage aspects — spying, because the other side does too — but you have two clashing… I mean, this is the most interesting… I am really gonna write my fiction book on this and put a lot of real facts in there. But NATO Gladio operation through Cyprus, Turkey; and the Russians being on the other side: that’s very interesting. I didn’t know about that, and this is going to really grab my interest for a long time until I research on this.
63:41 The other important thing that brings up is… I say, when we were talking about how much Russians know, I was, in a way, laughing, really; where… it was funny: when Russia — very smart move — they said they were kicking out all US NGOs. Because at the beginning of this show we were talking about, everybody says, “Oh yeah: well, CIA’s gonna station their intelligence-gathering officers in some embassies; they go to cocktails.” Everybody knows that embassies are… it’s what it used to be. Embassies are no longer used, because in every country the hosting country spies on you: because they know you are, their spy’s gonna be there. So it would be the dumbest thing to put your real intelligence-gathering officers inside an embassy, or consulate, or attaché, because that’s the first place your hosting nation is gonna look into. They gonna watch out, right?
64:40 So, what would they do? With US, the number one place — the number one place — we place our intelligence-gathering officers and informants in countries, is the NGOs. Every interesting, important — there are some Ph.Ds in their board of advisors, they are always on NPR: those — the ones in Russia, the ones in Central Asia/Caucasus, I would say over 90 percent of them are the best operations base for the CIA. So if it’s they are sending some educational English teachers to Azerbaijan… because suddenly it becomes so important for us to go and spend millions of dollars to teach English to Azerbaijanis, OK? It’s very important, James. So if you look at these English teachers we were talking about — Fethullah Gülen movement as well — they go with diplomatic passports, which gives them a certain level of immunity If they are busted. If they are arrested, they’re gonna say [gestures presenting document] — choop! — “I have diplomatic passports.”
65:38 Because they are spies. And this is how CIA, State Department, send their spies. So, Russians did a very good move. They’re like, “We know how you do it. We know how you entice terror; we know how you fund terror. We know your bases of operations in our country, or in all this — Central Asia/Caucasus — are the NGOs. So it was… really, it was funny! I mean, it’s interesting; it’s really highly entertaining to watch this Cold War taking place before you, and saying: “We are kicking you out.”
66:13 And here are these NGOs: they are saying, “You shouldn’t do that. We are improving humanity over there. We have NDAA over here, and Patriot Act, and drones, you know, frying us soon.” [laughs] “Over there… but our concentration is your people: because, to us, you guys are more important.” I mean — this is so altruistic, James! — that, as I said: with our prison conditions; with our own infrastructure or education problems; our homeless people; the percentage of people who are, right now, within really extreme poverty in the United States: we don’t have enough soup houses for those people. But we are such [an] altruistic nation that, “Here!” — from George Soros, to our CIA, to our Congress allocating hundreds… I mean, billions of dollars to our foreign aid to teach those kids English and to give them borscht, soup. We are wonderful. We are a wonderful nation. [laughs]
67:11 James: [laughs] Yes, yes: absolutely. Nothing suspicious about that. Well, Sibel, every single week I think we’re getting close to hitting bedrock, and every single week you continue to blow my mind and open up all sorts of other avenues. So once again, we’re gonna have to leave it there for this weeks’ conversation. But before we do, once again, I’d like people out there who are watching this and who are appreciating this incredible information that is coming week after week to cogitate on the fact that this is coming completely to you based on the support of the people out there who actually do support BoilingFrogsPost.com with their funds.
67:43 And once again, Boiling Frogs Post: 100 percent supported by the listeners and viewers out there; does not accept any money from any NGOs or shady organizations; and is doing an incredible amount of work. Not only this EyeOpener Report that’s coming to you every week, but also the podcasts; the nightly news roundup from non-MSM sources; and the editorials and everything that’s coming to you: once again, coming by your support. And on that note, we have just moved into the quarterly fundraising drive for BoilingFrogsPost.com. So Sibel, let’s talk a little bit about that. What are we hoping to raise, and how can people support Boiling Frogs Post?
68:23 Sibel: Well, one of the things that I try to do and I have been trying to do — and the decision came in 2007 — and I didn’t want, like… OK, so, FBI whistleblower: I’m gonna get over with my case, and put that… I want to turn it into something useful. And looking around and seeing that the number one reason for all the suffocation of my case and gagging was, A., not having a real media in this country — because media makes the case; once the case is made, you kind of utilize it and get the public’s support — and then, B., it’s the ignorance. It’s the importance of informing the public, giving the information to public.
69:04 And up until 2008, I was never, ever active in all this blogosphere. I mean, I was not at all within that crowd, within that circle. But I said, “This is one of the most important ways — and, if it is successful, productive ways — of putting my time and energy. And bringing other independent-minded, critical-thinking people: again, independence is extremely important. They are not partisan; they are not in the pockets of any of these foundations; they are not connected to any of these governmental powers, et cetera.
69:44 So, this is how it started. And I knew for it to be successful, for it to remain true to its mission — to its objective — we should never, ever compromise. Meaning, even if tempting — because my goodness, look at my website. The look of it is, like, three or four years old: it’s badly in need of a face-lift. We don’t have resources to have a website designer to do the needed changes, even to some of the mechanics. But despite all these tight resources, slowly and surely we put together this partnership with incredible minds. And that is Andrew Gavin Marshall; that is you, James Corbett the brilliant; we have Eric Draitser.
70:29 And if you go and look at the bios of our people, if you look at any of them, you would see one common area besides being brilliant and their being independent and creative. It’s that they are not partisan, and they are not in any way attached or have any connection to any interest — special interest. And that is extremely important. So that leaves only one way to have this entity that we put together operate and move forward and continue and expand: and that is [the] public, and public support. Whether it’s $5 dollars a month, whether it’s $50 dollars a month: anything that anybody can do within their means, that’s the only way we can survive, and that’s the only way we can continue.
71:15 Because what happens is some people — there are other people, wonderfully critical minds out there. The reason they can’t do it: they can’t afford spending this time. If you have to go and juggle a job — work nine hours out there and commute, and you have family responsibilities — then you don’t have the time it takes to produce these documents, to produce these video reports, and the podcasts, and the writing the stuff, and the bringing real news every night to people. So if you don’t have the time, at least help those people who are sacrificing from their own lives by giving up high-paying jobs and saying, “This is what I want to do, because I believe it’s extremely important to inform the public.” And not only that: once we have enough informed people united, then to say, “How do we bring about changes,” OK? And it’s not… I’m talking about kumbaya.
72:12 Anyhow: if we fail, it’s not gonna be some website, some enterprise failing with five, six people. If we fail, this notion and concept of people’s news site, people’s information site: it would mean that that has failed. Because when I started this website, people said, “No way. Either you’re gonna have advertisers or you’re gonna have sugar daddies.” You know, Soros has to become your sugar… maybe several sugar daddies. You’re gonna have a lot of fathers, and you have to basically operate under their thumbs. Because it has been tried; and people, they want everything free out there. And they won’t go for supporting… even though they think it’s a great idea, they won’t support.”
72:56 So far, we have proven them wrong, OK? We have been expanding. We started with me, and then it was an editorial cartoon added, and one podcast. Today we have four podcast shows; we have weekly investigative video reports; we have our own nightly news. So, let’s prove them wrong. Let’s say we can do it; it can be done with integrity and independence. And all those people who pessimistically warned us: they were wrong to say that it’s not possible. So, please: we only have one source for our funding; that’s you. And please support us. Help us with this operation; help us continue and expand. Thank you.
73:38 James: Well, Sibel, I couldn’t have said it better myself, and if I wasn’t already a member of your team, I would [laughs] I would definitely be signing up today. So I will put the link in the show notes for people to…
73:47 Sibel: Thank you.
73:48 James: …the post about the quarterly fund drive, so that people out there can help support this. And as with every interview we’ve been doing, I’ll put in the links in the show notes to all of the relevant articles and things that can start people on a quest of finding out more about these subjects. And I think we’re going to leave it there for this week, but once again, next week we will be tackling some of the comments and questions out there from you, the listeners and viewers. So please get your comments and questions in — preferably through the contact form on CorbettReport.com — and I”ll make sure that we get to as many of them as we possibly can next week. So Sibel, that’s going to do it for today. Thank you once again for your time.
74:22 Sibel: Thank you, James. Looking forward to our next week’s session. Because I love answering questions; and even with radio interviews, the ones that involve direct questions from people, those are the ones that I like to participate in the most. So I’m looking forward to it.
74:37 James [voice-over]: This video is brought to you by the subscribers of BoilingFrogsPost.com. For more more information on this and other topics, please go to BoilingFrogsPost.com. For more information and commentary from James Corbett, please go to CorbettReport.com.
This transcript by “Adjuvant” is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.